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From Parameters, Summer 1996, pp. 32-49.
They tell this story about Fred Cuny, the Intertec relief worker and tragic victim of the hostilities in Chechnya. During
the Biafran civil war in the late 1960s, the relief agencies providing assistance faced many operational challenges.
Relief workers were particularly stumped by the rapidly deteriorating public health conditions. Recognizing the need
for proper field sanitation to improve the quality of public health, Cuny attacked the problem at its basic level: he
pointed out that somebody had to dig latrines. The response he received from the agencies was that no one knew how
to construct latrines; Cuny replied that millions of manuals on the subject had been printed by the world's armies, and
asked why the relief community couldn't acquire the necessary information from such manuals. The difficulty, he
learned, was that no one knew whom to approach in the military to obtain them.[1]
Nearly 30 years later, in a world struggling to cope with many complex emergencies, there is still a communications
gap between the civilian and military communities that respond to the emergencies. In many respects, the mutual
understanding essential to success has not moved beyond Fred Cuny's experience. The reasons why this cooperation is
difficult to establish and sustain and what practitioners--civilian and military alike--can do to improve prospects for
more effective peace operations are the focus of this article.
The article draws on the author's peacekeeping experiences in Israel and Lebanon and more recent field experience in
multidimensional peace operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Angola.[2] It examines the nature of the multidimensional
peace operation--its composition, organization, and objectives and strategies--and then identifies certain factors that
affect any peace operation. These include ethnic considerations, non-state actors, international community
organization, the target community's capacity to absorb reforms and recovery efforts, and external support of the
mission's strategy.[3]
The challenge in coordinating operations in the field includes establishing and maintaining a balance between
cooperation and independence among the participants.[4] Key issues here are intramission cooperation and
independence, prioritizing efforts and resources, building teamwork, and reducing the inevitable organizational friction
inherent in such operations. The article concludes with observations on expectations, timing, and sustainment of an
operation as well as some thoughts on high-level operational planning.
The Multidimensional Peace Operation Framework
A host of factors requires detailed attention at every organizational level by participants in a multidimensional peace
operation. Foremost is a clear understanding of the physical environment in which the mission will operate. Thereafter,
planners must consider the composition of the international organizations responding to the crisis, the organizational
relationships among these agencies, and the strategies, objectives, and operational methods of all participants.
Analysis of the mission's operational environment should begin with a concerted effort to identify the core problem to
be alleviated by the humanitarian intervention. Problem definition is complicated by the fact that the challenges facing
the international community in any complex emergency will be many and diverse; each will have its own constituency
demanding priority and immediate attention to its particular interest. The intervention in Somalia was prompted in part
by intense international media coverage of the famine in that country. UNITAF, UNOSOM I, and UNOSOM II were
to discover that social and political imbalances were the real causes of the hardships that had led to the famine.[5] The
intervention brought the immediate problem under control; it could do little to compensate for the deep social and

political divisions in the country. The gravity of a particular emergency, the need for a reasonable and rapid solution,
the invariably constrained resources, and the short attention span of the international community emphasize the need
for a clear understanding of the core problem before committing to such missions.
Planners need to develop a comprehensive view of the physical and social conditions that exist in the mission area.
Topics such as these should be addressed from the outset of planning:
state of the target community's political, military, economic, and social institutions
status of military and police organizations
health conditions of the citizens and the refugee population
ability of local community leaders to exercise their authority
condition and status of assistance currently being provided by international organizations: structure, volume,
processes, and relevance to the problem as it is defined
current popular attitudes regarding the crisis, especially related to day-to-day existence and the prospect of
outside assistance
capacity and will of the receiving nation to cope with an assisted recovery
significant population shifts that result from or may have contributed to the crisis
existence and condition of school systems
condition of the business community
Questions about the current status of relief efforts can be answered through an analysis of local, regional, and
international media attention to the crisis. It is important to know, for example, if there is any major power interest in
the humanitarian relief mission, particularly in its composition and activities. The policies and practices of the regional
or international authority behind the intervention also must be clear. Other essential information is related to policy
deliberations and decisions that have led to the mandate for the mission; matters related to the composition of the
mission; discussions related to the mission's strategy; designation of a lead regional or international relief agency;
experience of the international relief community in the crisis area, and the implications of that experience for the
mission's strategy. There will never be enough time before launching the operation to complete research into all such
topics.
Time also must be spent analyzing the physical environment. Regional analyses, UN assessments, and relief
organization reports are valuable resources; discussions with individuals familiar with the area and its issues will also
be required. Much as a lawyer who hopes to succeed must know the case before entering the courtroom, so the
successful peace operations practitioner will know the crisis before engaging in the mission.
The composition of the intervention team is important to that success. More often than not, by the time the US Army
becomes involved, a regional or international organization will be either assembling or already in place. The
sponsoring international body usually will be represented on site. For operations directed by the United Nations, a
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)--almost always an experienced career international civil
servant--will not only define the organization's operational methods, objectives, and resources, but will also integrate
the efforts of the diverse groups that will carry out the intervention. It is also important to know where on the UN's
crowded humanitarian relief agenda any particular crisis fits. Recent reforms in the United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) have added immeasurably to the institution's ability to plan, execute, and manage
diverse, simultaneous operations in the field. Nevertheless, it is important to assess any new mission's purpose and
appeal to the nations that have been asked to furnish human, financial, or other resources as the operation develops.
In addition to the UN departments directly involved with creating and conducting a specific humanitarian intervention
operation, an array of international organizations (IO) will most likely participate. They will be of varying importance
and can play multiple roles in dealing with a given crisis. These organizations will raise the issue of the proper balance
between independent and integrated, coordinated operations. However, unlike private voluntary organizations (PVOs),
which must also be dealt with individually, many of the international organizations are affiliated with or integral to the
United Nations. The task of integrating their activities is therefore assisted by the broad authority of the SRSG. In the
final analysis, commonality of purpose among the diverse groups involved in responses to complex humanitarian
emergencies depends to a great extent on the strength of character, leadership, and personality of the Special

Representative.
The targeted country's institutions are important to the mission's plans and activities; they determine the long-term
success of the intervention. Whatever attention can be given to the sustainability of these local institutions will reap
great rewards, whether a mission is deployed to implement, make, enforce, or keep a peace, or to assist in rebuilding a
nation. Any humanitarian intervention provides no more than a short-term fix for the immediate problem. It offers a
moment's respite to allow those suffering and in need to get their community back on its feet.
Long-term solutions come from indigenous resources and energies. Local institutions and assets must be engaged at
appropriate times during the intervention; planners and operators should therefore become aware of the ability of local
organizations and structures to absorb investment and to sustain change and development. A relief plan in excess of a
billion dollars was initiated in Haiti in 1995, yet two years earlier the country had difficulty absorbing several million
dollars in foreign assistance. The international financial and development communities presumably understand this
weakness and are directing resources to strengthen Haiti's capability to receive, administer, and apply the assistance it
so desperately requires.
Private voluntary organizations and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) will invariably be partners in any
humanitarian intervention.[6] The mission has to structure itself to connect and cooperate with this component of the
relief community. The mission's humanitarian and development elements, civilian and military alike, together with the
PVOs, must seek mutually agreeable, responsive, and nonthreatening ties among themselves. These strong ties must
exist at all levels--from the board rooms of the PVOs, the United Nations Secretariat, and the major command
headquarters through the offices of PVO country directors, the SRSG, and the task force commanders, to the PVO
field practitioner, United Nations Zone Director, and Army or Marine Corps battalion commander. Operational
freedom, proactive communications, vigorous liaison, and networking among the political, military, and relief
communities are at the heart of successful coordination and cooperation.
Finally, there may well be unilateral players in the mission area. Often nations will develop assistance programs to
support their force contingents or national private organizations in a multinational peacekeeping operation. These
programs may or may not be executed with broader mission strategies in mind; they could in fact be at cross purposes
with the mission's objectives and efficient operations. In southern Somalia, cooperation with Belgian diplomatic
authorities was important to ensure that unilateral humanitarian assistance from Brussels to support Belgian military
forces operating in the zone complemented the broader relief strategy.
Once the composition of the mission team is clear, it is important to understand the organizational relationships among
all participants. In UN peace operations, a mission's mandate can include Security Council resolutions and decisions,
Secretariat reports, and member states' international policies as well as directive and coordinating responsibilities
among the agencies taking part in the operation. As the mission's mandate takes shape and after field assessments are
evaluated, DPKO planners and trainers, guided by the UN budget process and in cooperation with mission advance
teams, will develop, refine, staff, and finalize the mission's concept and orders. DPKO then recruits, equips, trains, and
deploys the civilian and military components of the mission; DPKO also will provide oversight for the operation from
UN headquarters in New York. Participants should bear in mind, however, that the functions and responsibilities of the
UN-affiliated international organizations and other specialized agencies involved in the intervention, because they are
often directed from headquarters not collocated with the UN, may not be clear at the mission's outset. Commanders
and planners therefore will have to monitor the activities of all participants in the crisis area.
Balancing the mission's resources becomes a key challenge once the intervention is under way. If the central problem
has been correctly identified and if the mission has been properly resourced, reasonably successful outcomes can be
expected. Success requires constant attention to unpredictable shifts in the events that were the basis for the mission's
initial strategy. Clarity of purpose and objectives among the mission's component organizations are essential to
keeping the work of all elements coordinated and within the limits of the plan. The exchange of information within the
mission, in conjunction with mutually agreed methods to identify and to resolve differences, are prerequisites for
success. This notion of shared responsibility and purpose should extend from the mission to all other agencies and
institutions operating in the area, including national and local organizations of the host state. The relief mission, a
collective of diverse enterprises, must actively encourage coordination, cooperation, and teamwork among groups that

are often unprepared for any constraints on their operations. As with so many other responses to complex, often
unprecedented challenges, success depends on leadership and vision.
Reduced to its essentials, a multidimensional peace operation generally involves varying measures of stability and
security operations, political initiatives, and humanitarian relief and economic programs. Military operations are
derived from interpretations of mandates, resolutions, and national policies. Equally important for military planners
and leaders is an understanding of how the military's contribution complements the broader goals and objectives of the
mission. Each decision or action taken must be considered in terms of whether it helps to solve or contributes to the
basic problem.
Similarly, the mission's political initiatives must be inspired by cultural sensitivity. More often than not, local
ratification of the mission's political strategy for ending the crisis is a prerequisite for success. This condition needs to
be recognized and provisions made to involve broad and diverse segments of the local citizenry in mission activities,
notwithstanding the time delays and extra effort required to persuade and accommodate such participation. Political
activities, particularly reconciliation and conflict resolution efforts, should support all of the mission's objectives and
not be--or even appear to be--at cross purposes or in competition with other programs and initiatives.
Finally, effective humanitarian relief and sustainable economic development require a strategy that is feasible,
affordable, and internally and externally credible. There will be a natural tendency to concentrate resources at the hub
of national activity; this impulse must be avoided. Attention to "the field"--in this instance to relief operations in the
local communities--must reach the farthest link in the assistance chain. Despite the differences among relief and
development institutions and organizations--size, resources, operational focus, and efficiency--it is essential that all
involved in the intervention make every effort to join together, to appear and behave as a single entity, one whose
collective voice will be sufficiently strong to ensure a balanced response to the crisis.
Factors that Affect the Mission
While there is no checklist worth considering during the planning and execution of a multidimensional peace
operation, several factors seem to be present in virtually every complex emergency. Any one of these considerations, if
left unattended, can upset the best-planned, resourced, and managed intervention.
Foremost is the effect of local culture on the mission's operations. Given the pressures associated with preparing for
an international peace operation, few participants will find the time to learn about the social, political, and economic
roots of the crisis. Mission efforts to understand the crisis and to design suitable remedies can be hampered by caution,
uncertainty, and xenophobia within the troubled state, occasionally even among national leaders of the targeted
population. The following anecdote is instructive. For six months the author's office and authority as the United
Nations Zone Director appeared to be moving the conflict in southern Somalia toward resolution. On closer
examination, reconciliation proved to be the result of the agendas, personalities, and energies of local leaders. The
Somalis had been controlling the reconciliation effort from the outset, with only an occasional boost from the
intervention force. In many instances, local leaders set the long-term agenda and frequently the day-to-day program.
The second important factor is the non-state actor: militia chief, traditional elder, bandit, informal community leader,
and the like. These individuals have to be identified and understood lest they remain invisible to the outsider. Their
roles, motives, objectives, and the basis of their popular support must be determined as quickly as possible. Equally
important is establishing the mission's relationship with these figures, particularly regarding their influence on the
mission's impartiality and the sense of fairness that must guide the mission's activities. Identifying them can be more
difficult than imagined. Well into the author's assignment in Somalia, new and influential community leaders continued
to introduce themselves. All were important to the peace process, few had agendas in common, and all had particular
reasons for declining to participate at the outset of UN-sponsored initiatives in the region. Time and circumstances
eventually allowed many of these individuals to exercise their authority and influence in constructive ways to advance
the peace process.
Once identified, many of these informal, local, special-interest advocates become candidates for receiving power and
privilege over their neighbors. When the mission extends authority to a local individual or agency in a socio-political
environment that traditionally inhibits power-sharing, that authority is frequently acquired at the expense of some other

community figure or activity. Care must be exercised that decisions to award contracts, distribute funds and assistance,
and support certain individuals do not lead to outcomes opposite to the intended consequences, as the following
example demonstrates.
The three-year civil war that caused major demographic shifts in southern Somalia had produced many orphans in
Kisimayo, a regional population center. When a call went out from the zone's humanitarian affairs officer for
"orphanages" to identify themselves, a number of children's centers seemingly appeared overnight. Relief funds and
supplies were then distributed to some of these centers after they had been certified. It was subsequently discovered
that children in many of them had been transferred from displaced-person camps and other relief points in response to
the call for orphanages. Soon the new "orphanages" began to receive a portion of the relief that had been planned to
support those traditional aid distribution points, whose allocations had been established some time earlier by a census.
In several instances, the directors of the new "orphanages" suffered the wrath of their neighbors whose benefits had
been diminished. The good, but misplaced, intentions of the United Nations mission were the cause of the problem.
The lesson to be learned from such examples is that popular endorsement of all aspects of the mission's operations is
essential. Long-term rather than short-term solutions to the community's problems should be the rule; participation of
local problem-solvers should be cultivated by all components of the mission. Notwithstanding their efficiency, modern
high-tech practices that we take for granted, unless tempered by local norms, can be inappropriate for solving the
community's problems.
The regional reconciliation process in southern Somalia mentioned earlier was structured to take advantage of
contemporary Western processes. Committees, subcommittees, working groups, partial and plenary sessions,
statements of the problem and potential courses of action, negotiation and mediation methods, and generally accepted
conference and debate procedures were the norm during the 47 days of meetings that produced the accord. However,
an underlying, serious problem required resolution before agreement could be reached: compensation for atrocities that
had occurred during the conflict. No amount of contemporary problem-solving techniques, or logic for that matter,
seemed likely to settle the compensation issue.
As it turned out, in the midst of the meetings of committees and working groups, of debates and associated procedures,
a traditional Somali process emerged, impromptu, and solved this potentially intractable problem. It is noteworthy that
the author had absolutely nothing to do with inspiring the events that established compensation for the community's
dead. In hindsight, the peace accord was a unique blend of two cultural approaches to settling communal conflicts,
serendipitous yet informative regarding the value of this problem-solving combination, and, most important,
instructive regarding the value of cultural awareness to the success of these operations.
A third factor influencing mission success is the organizational strength of the international community responding
to the crisis. Strife and destitution in the suffering country can overwhelm the assets of any and all organizations that
respond to the emergency. Demands on the mission are urgent and complex; resources are often limited and not always
efficiently applied. The SRSG can help to prioritize and allocate shortages.
As the mission's leadership deals with the gaps between requirements and resources, the mission must constantly
review the shifting array of problems it faces to ensure that mission components are applying their talents in as many
areas as possible. In Haiti, for example, the human rights monitors were asked how they might contribute to the civilpolice training curriculum to increase the graduates' sensitivity to the personal rights of the citizens being served.
Another inherent problem facing the managers of a multidimensional peace operation is the requirement to balance
force protection commitments against the pressing needs for the military, such as support for elections. Comparable
assessments must be made of the changing priorities of PVOs. Those organizations do the best they can with the assets
at hand while they try to compensate for the vagaries--at times the inertia--of the international donor community.
Reflections on the strength and welfare of the mission must include an appreciation of the effects of profiteering.
Many will find it a sad comment on human nature to acknowledge the behavior of individuals who try to profit through
manipulation, coercion, and terror directed at the humanitarian relief process. The reality is that governments as well as
non-state actors make a practice of capitalizing on others' misfortune. Events in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former
Yugoslavia have affirmed that tribal and ethnic differences are sufficient distinctions to turn neighbor against neighbor,

friend against friend. The challenge is to establish and enforce rules to prevent local behavior and practices from
undermining the fundamental premise of fairness that must guide the operations of the international relief community.
In addition to cultural factors and the mission's organizational strengths, dialogue, mutual understanding, and
compromise are also needed to reinforce the operational foundation of the intervention. Within the mission,
interconnectivity among field offices is essential to success. Weeks went by after the author assumed responsibility in
southern Somalia before effective lines of communication were established with UNOSOM headquarters in
Mogadishu. Because reports and guidance could not be exchanged in a timely fashion, operations in both locations
were diminished in the complicated, rapidly changing environment. Without a very proactive approach to internal
communications, any relief group or organization faces a host of competing priorities and high prospects for
misunderstanding, missed opportunities, and possibly failure.
A fourth factor that affects mission plans and operations is the local community's capacity to absorb change. To the
greatest possible extent, the mission's strategy, especially its objectives, should be designed from the local community's
perspective and coordinated with that community during implementation. A strategy that appears appropriate to the
mission staff may be fundamentally flawed when viewed by the beneficiaries, as the following story suggests.
After the successful conclusion of the Kisimayo reconciliation accord, UNOSOM headquarters attempted to introduce
the Transitional National Council (TNC) government process to the region. The TNC governance program was a
bottom-up concept intended to bring participatory democracy to Somalia's 92 districts. They in turn were expected to
elect representatives to the country's regions; a national council of representatives ultimately would be chosen from the
regions to govern until a time when nationwide elections could be held to reestablish the country's political leadership.
The difficulty with UNOSOM's plan was that the three-year civil war had seriously destabilized demographic patterns
in the southern region of the country. Local dignitaries, many from the displaced and minority communities, across
clan affiliations, joined in denouncing the UN's proposal to inaugurate the TNC program without allowing a reasonable
period for the provisions and sentiments of the accord mentioned above to take hold at the community level. In future
operations the relief mission and the local community should work together, to the extent of developing a "contract"
among responsible parties, so that a recovery strategy can be developed with the full participation of local leaders. The
result can be a community that has invested in its rehabilitation, offering the requisite local judgments when necessary,
which creates an atmosphere of popular tolerance and discipline concerning all mission operations. That tolerance, in
no small measure, allows the intervention strategy to take hold and flourish.
The fifth and last major factor relates to external support of the mission's strategy and programs. All mission
components must be informed about the nature and degree of international assistance for the mission's operations.
Some offices within the mission, primarily those with relief and reconstruction responsibilities, focus almost
exclusively on this subject. While others may appear marginally interested in the external donor world, the fact is that
outside support of the mission is integral to virtually every facet of mission business. The mission's military forces and
civil-police agency are dependent upon donated human and material resources; military observers and human rights
monitors have to be recruited from suitable national sources; external funding is needed for election expenses; and
humanitarian relief and economic development programs require investment from donor nations and international
financial institutions. Input from the field--the relief mission's outstations--is also important in building a case for
donor contributions. The mission's success at coordinating and integrating operations around a shared strategy and
common objectives reinforces its appeal for all forms of external support.
The local community's ability and willingness to play one agency off against another will also affect the mission's
strategy. It was the writer's experience that the Somali was a master at this destructive practice. Inevitable cracks in the
mission's cohesiveness, caused by internal conflicts, misunderstanding, or the subordination of the mission's larger
purpose to that of one component or organization, will be exploited by local interests bent on profiting from any
internal disarray. The most effective remedies for this problem are the awareness of its inevitability and the
understanding that it can be offset by close coordination of policy, plans, and operations at all implementing levels
among all organizations in the mission area.
Coordinating Multidimensional Peace Operations

One of the most daunting challenges facing managers of multidimensional peace operations designed to overcome
complex emergencies is establishing a balance between cooperation and independence among the components of the
international community that have responded to the crisis. This section examines organizational conflicts caused by
agencies working at cross purposes within the relief effort. Methods for dealing with operations in collapsed states
include techniques that can help the manager in the field coordinate international efforts during complex emergencies.
Recent international interventions have included military forces to deal with stability and security requirements. When
required, a civil police training and advisory element has also been part of the mission. Political initiatives, such as
cease-fires and disarmament, as well as national and local negotiations, mediation, conflict management, and
reconciliation programs, are managed through the UN Mission's political office, whose director reports to the SRSG.
Humanitarian assistance--food distribution and public health concerns--will be the responsibility of the mission's
director of humanitarian affairs, assisted by a variety of United Nations special agencies. Others involved with food
and health matters can include the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a host of international,
regional, national, and local private voluntary organizations or non-government organizations. Longer term economic
rehabilitation will be the responsibility of United Nations Development Programme, international financial institutions,
regional development organizations, interested nations through bilateral aid programs, and the host government, to the
extent that it can assist.
Refugees and displaced persons will be looked after by the United Nations, other appropriate international agencies,
and local national organizations. Included in this category are the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA), and the International Office of
Migration. Human rights matters are the responsibility of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights;
in some instances regional human rights organizations--in Haiti, for example, it was the Organization of American
States--will also participate in this function. The team assembled to answer a call for help on an international scale is
large, diverse, and represents many constituencies. The field manager must follow closely the charter and evolution of
agencies, their membership and methods, and operational priorities. Everything about peace operations is dynamic.
Field coordinators and senior management will have to determine--sometimes help to establish--what is acceptable
among and between agencies regarding shared goals, plans, and operational methods. During the author's service in
southern Somalia, military forces were employed in conventional security operations; food and health agencies in
feeding, nutrition, and health clinic activities; and ICRC and UNHCR in refugee and displaced-person programs. All
of these organizations, however, were influenced by the need to help bring about the peaceful reconciliation of the
region's communities, shattered by 20 years of dictatorship and the subsequent three-year civil war and famine. The
need for reconciliation became the overriding consideration for many in positions of responsibility; a lengthy peace
conference was its centerpiece. Awareness of this fact encouraged a sense of cooperation and common purpose among
diverse relief groups which, in turn, enhanced mission accomplishment by all agencies in the Southern Zone.
The field manager should strive for early, selective, and purposeful collective planning and decisionmaking to
determine acceptable limits for cooperation among supporting agencies. The threatening environment characteristic of
most humanitarian interventions spreads risks and sacrifices more or less equitably within the relief community. The
coordinator can capitalize on this risk as an incentive to encourage attendance at daily coordination meetings. Equality
can be underscored by constantly changing the location and moderator for these meetings. If handled properly, no
single agency will be perceived to be "in charge." Divisions among team members, often between the military and the
rest of the team, must be addressed as soon as they appear. For example, military outposts in remote areas of the
Southern Zone in Somalia were better received by the local communities if humanitarian relief, under escort by
UNOSOM military forces, followed an agreed schedule, even if the schedule at times conflicted with planned military
operations. Here the military demonstrated its willingness to adapt to a need that the relief community as a whole
considered more beneficial to the group than military-specific activities on their behalf. But there are no rules to
determine when such compromises are required; each field manager in a position to make those decisions must
understand the risks, potential costs and benefits, and the capacity of his or her colleagues to meet the new or changed
requirement.
Personnel rotations and the occasional arrival of a new organization are events that demand the field manager's

immediate attention. New personnel must develop a thorough understanding of current operational methods and the
contributions expected of all members of the team. Relief agencies often shift their emphasis from one part of the host
nation to another, which can bring those agencies into contact with other parts of the intervention group that had no
prior experience with the relief community. Such shifts have to be anticipated, planned for, and managed; all
concerned can help to compensate for sudden arrivals and departures of members of the international relief community.
Major decisions by any agency that have potentially profound effects on the team should be discussed, coordinated,
and implemented collectively. In June 1993, the ICRC determined that its feeding programs had effectively dealt with
the malnourished in the Southern Somalia Zone, that the food crisis had passed, and that the agency had to relocate to
other areas in need of its services. The decision was made without informing in a timely fashion other organizations in
the region; the ICRC abruptly left the zone, confusing and upsetting not only other relief agencies but also many of the
local people. On very short notice, the rest of the team developed a stop-gap program that adjusted food sources and
distribution plans, and gradually helped the local communities to become reasonably self-sufficient. In this instance,
early coordination (or even notification) would have reduced anxiety among local Somalis as well as others in the
international relief community.
All activities in an intervention need large measures of flexibility and creativity. Once the civilian agencies acquire
confidence in each other and agree to the strategy behind their parts in the intervention, these agencies can
demonstrate remarkable initiative and resourcefulness. Paradoxically, the uniformed services, which have so much to
offer the collective enterprise, may require more time and outreach than the civilians to develop an informal approach
to meeting day-to-day requirements. In Somalia, the Kisimayo reconciliation conference required daily meetings
involving 200 local participants for almost two months to reach consensus. Substantial security and other military
support for the conference was required from the reinforced Belgian army airborne battalion and Botswana light
infantry company with a combined strength of approximately 950 personnel. Given the large regional stability task, the
local military commander was unhappy with the size and duration of his commitment to the reconciliation conference.
Ensuring the commander's support was essential and, at times, not without stress; not only did we have to make a
compelling case to the local military commander, but he, in turn, had to be persuasive with his superiors at UNOSOM
headquarters as well.
Relief agencies, by contrast, were quicker than the military to offer support for the conference, providing food,
administrative material, and blankets upon which to sit; in some instances this material exceeded the normal
operational charters of the donors. For example, the World Food Program located in the zone's headquarters in
Kisimayo, which donated food to the conference, ordinarily provided assistance only through agricultural, fishing, and
other rural development programs. Their willingness to adapt reflected their understanding of the importance of
reconciliation to the overarching strategy for the Southern Zone.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it will be impossible to retain the cooperation and support of all members of the relief
team. Events will drive some agencies to more independent operations. Personal threats to members of a relief
organization can cause leaders to make decisions that separate the organization from the team's joint efforts.
Regardless of the reasons for such changes, the field coordinator must respect the decisions and not interfere with
members of the community that feel compelled to perform their mission without coordination or collaboration.
Organizational friction is inevitable in complex, diverse peace operations, and the field coordinator can take several
measures to minimize its effects. First, try to get to the root of the problem and determine, if possible, its potential
consequences for the goals of the relief operation. Individual or organizational fatigue, resource or operational
shortfall, changes in the local environment--the list is endless, and each incident requires a rapid and forthright
assessment. The field coordinator needs to determine what aspects of the problem can reasonably be influenced, what
aspects require outside help, where to find likely sources of assistance, and what aspects are considered to be beyond
immediate solution. The latter may eventually be recognized as intractable, but they can sometimes be ameliorated
with careful attention.
Second, when confronted with organizations at cross purposes, the coordinator should always try to seek resolutions at
the most informal level of relations between the opposing individuals or agencies. The relief community is wellconnected for information and very sensitive to personal or organizational aberrations. Seek a simple, straightforward

solution to the difficulty; avoid public airing of the details, which risks inviting into the debate those who had been
spectators. Such an outcome invariably complicates problem-solving.
Third, the most important reason for limiting knowledge of the problem is the potential harm that could follow should
the issue become known to the local populace. Local interference in the daily operations of the relief effort is a very
important consideration, one that under the best of circumstances is nearly impossible to prevent. As much as the
international team thinks it understands local culture, attitudes, and perceptions, once an internal problem becomes
generally known to the local nationals, the field coordinator and individual relief workers must exercise great caution
to offset local efforts to drive wedges into the relief community. Local organizations that oppose the international effort
will not waste time capitalizing on a real or perceived fracture in the relief team's cohesiveness, to the detriment of all,
as the following example indicates.
Relief agencies operating in southern Somalia were unable to standardize local labor wages for offloading relief ships,
a failure that caused considerable difficulty among the agencies. The local Somali labor committee pitted one agency
against another when negotiating wages, threatening one relief agency head who resisted higher wages that another
agency head had been coerced into paying. Indeed, the January 1993 assassination of Sean Deveraux, a member of the
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) staff in Kisimayo, was traced to attempts by UNICEF to eliminate such
coercive labor practices.
In such situations, all elements of the international relief community must become involved in the search for
alternatives. Organizational differences will have to be subordinated, at least temporarily, to the interests and goals of
the larger relief community. During periods of heightened tensions, whatever the cause, it is all the more difficult to
maintain the objectivity needed to solve underlying problems.
Future Multidimensional Peace Operations
The following insights from the author's experience in Somalia and Haiti may fall short of universal truths; knowledge
of them could, however, enhance--if not quite guarantee--the prospects for success in future peace operations. They
are equally relevant to the uniformed and civilian practitioner, regardless of the contribution each makes in responding
to a complex humanitarian emergency. These insights should be considered first as planners and commanders prepare
for an intervention.
Establish reasonable expectations for success. Participants should keep in mind that operations with well-thought-out
plans and consistent execution, whether under the control of the United Nations or regional or national groups, offer
only a window of opportunity for nations and peoples to improve their condition. National or international prestige
should not be at stake in any intervention aimed at reducing conflict, providing humanitarian assistance, restoring
governance, rehabilitating an economy, or developing a nation. Expectations of success must be defined, understood,
and shared between and among the recipients and providers of assistance. Measures of progress should be taken early
and frequently, and success should be expected in small increments. As a complement to measuring progress,
strategies and operations designed to ease the emergency should be continually reviewed.
All parties to the complex emergency, those that are suffering as well as those laboring to relieve suffering, must
acknowledge the constraints that exist, and seek to apply all available resources to treat and remedy the problem in a
cooperative fashion. The most evident constraint is the gap between the needs of the people in the affected country and
the resources available to the international community.
No international relief effort will ever have sufficient time or resources to resolve a conflict, enforce peace, or build a
nation. End states for interventions, whether determined by events, by time, or by international mandates, should allow
humanitarian organizations to establish reasonable, achievable intermediate goals and objectives en route to the
terminating event or date. More often than not, security and stability objectives of a complex humanitarian crisis can
and will be met long before social, political, economic, institutional, and infrastructure goals have been attained. The
challenge here is to make the most of each component's contribution within the time allotted for its participation.
The second important consideration in multidimensional peace operations is timing. The schedule to restore a complex
emergency to normalcy is inevitably driven by forces and factors external to the crisis. International focus and

priorities, influential national interests, and other emergencies competing for attention and resources come to mind as
determinants of staying power in any particular intervention. Attempts to allow considerations external to the crisis to
set the clock and the agenda need to be resisted. While a sense of urgency between those experiencing the crisis and
those trying to treat it may coincide, capabilities to plan, organize, and respond to the problem are not comparable. In
the final analysis, a strategy to overcome a complex emergency has a greater chance for success if it is anchored in the
local reality of emergency conditions rather than in external, artificial schedules and milestones. Do not try to rush
what can't be rushed.
A third consideration has to do with sustainment. It needs to be recognized that any international response to complex
emergencies will be plagued at the outset by insufficient resources, conflicting interests and priorities, and short
attention to the problem. The notion that Band-Aid approaches can help to relieve these emergencies is both wasteful
and perilous. The international relief community should not be expected, nor should it try, to deal with the problem
unaided. An enduring solution to the crisis almost always requires a combination of international and local resources
and efforts. The challenge in a cooperative approach is to identify and empower the most appropriate and effective
local institutions to share with the international relief community the management of the problem and the effort to
bring about peaceful and sustained change.
Perhaps the most important consideration regarding future peace operations, however, is the requirement to develop a
sound strategy, one that makes the best possible use of the partnership that assembles to solve the problem. While
each major component of the intervention team--from the political, military, and humanitarian communities--will
undoubtedly have distinct operational concepts and plans, an overarching strategy understood by and supported by all
the members of the team is absolutely essential to a successful mission.
All participants in the intervention must contribute to the strategy designed to resolve the crisis. All should seek to
identify accurately the basic causes of instability. For military participants in peace operations this collective judgment
determines the configuration, planning, mission, objectives, deployment, and operations of the military force that is
expected to restore order. Having all participants provide information and ideas as the international force is being
recruited, assembled, trained, and deployed will add much to the prospects for establishing the stable working
relationships so important to the mission's broader objectives.
While the devil is always in the details of any strategy, the conceptual model for producing the strategy is relatively
straightforward and worth mentioning. The strategic ends are derived from a clear identification of the root causes of
the emergency. These ends define the conceptual framework for what has to be accomplished in order to remove those
causes and restore the crisis area to some measure of normality.
The strategic ways through which the above concept is carried out are derived from the local, national, regional, and
international institutions, organizations, and instruments of authority that are available to help overcome the
emergency. Examples of strategic ways include bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, UN Security Council resolutions,
regional security and economic assistance agreements, and international and regional financial policies.
The strategic means that resource the chosen ways are found in the structures and capacities of the international,
regional, national, and local institutions--public and private--that share an interest in combating the complex
humanitarian emergency. Examples of strategic means are UN peace operations, the programs of international relief
organizations, humanitarian assistance projects undertaken by private and non-government organizations, bilateral
assistance initiatives, ad hoc technical assistance programs, economic development assessments, and financial grants
and aid.
The latrine problem that Fred Cuny faced in Biafra more than a quarter of a century ago has by and large been solved.
Today Fred's successors--those who share his vision--would probably define the new challenges as the need for a
vibrant spirit of cooperation, marked by information exchange and integrated strategies and practices among the many
organizations dedicated to relieving suffering around the world. The number and variety of appeals to the international
community for humanitarian assistance may have changed since Fred Cuny's time, but the requirements for success
have remained relatively constant.

NOTES
1. William Shawcross, "A Hero of Our Time," The New York Review, 30 November 1995, pp. 35-39.
2. The author was a member of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) during the early 1970s in
Israel and Lebanon and has had more recent field experience in Somalia, Haiti, and Angola. While in Somalia, the
author served as the United Nations Zone Director responsible for all UN operations in the southern region. His service
in Haiti and Angola was as a member of the United Nations Training Assistance Teams that provided pre-mission
training to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), and to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission
(UNAVEM III).
3. For the purpose of this article, multidimensional peace operations are defined as actions taken in the field by
national, regional, and international organizations to respond to a man-made or natural crisis that presents several
dimensions of political, military, economic, and social problems which require resolution by the intervening
organizations. These peace operations are undertaken in support of diplomatic initiatives designed to restore order to
the area experiencing the complex emergency. The term "mission" is synonymous with the organizations that assemble
in the field to solve the problems created by the crisis.
4. Field operatives seek to balance the need for cooperation in support of a common strategy and the independence that
enables each organization to comply with its internal policies and controls. The participants--civilian and military,
governmental and private, expatriate and local--will be looking for the ways and means to remedy the core problems
in the troubled state or region. Field coordination relates to the responsibilities of the leadership of the mission at the
farthest extension of the intervention, i.e. those mission components that directly confront the basic manifestations of
the crisis, to bring the mission together in a common purpose with a coordinated, integrated plan. In the author's case
in southern Somalia, as the senior United Nations official in the region, the coordinating challenge was to bring
together the efforts of the zone's military forces, United Nations political initiatives, the international and private relief
organizations, and local community groups in a coherent, cooperative fashion to achieve shared goals.
5. United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) I was created under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
751 in April 1992. UNOSOM I deployed in September 1992 under Chapter VI of the UN Charter to provide protection
for humanitarian relief organizations. UNOSOM I ceased operations in April 1993. The United Nations International
Task Force (UNITAF) was created under SCR 794 in December 1992. UNITAF deployed in December 1992 under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to exercise all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian
relief operations. UNITAF ceased operations in May 1993. UNOSOM II was created under SCR 814 in March 1993.
UNOSOM II deployed in May 1993 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to provide a secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations, implement a disarmament program, provide humanitarian assistance, rehabilitate
political and economic institutions, and promote national reconciliation. UNOSOM II ceased operations in March
1995.
6. See Andrew S. Natsios, "The International Humanitarian Response System," Parameters, 25 (Spring 1995), 68-81;
and Peter J. Spiro, "New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decisionmaking
Institutions," Parameters, 25 (Spring 1995), 43-54.
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